Yet another ‘tool for growth’? Labour migration policy and varieties of capitalism in France and Germany by Paul, Regine
        
Citation for published version:
Paul, R 2011, 'Yet another ‘tool for growth’? Labour migration policy and varieties of capitalism in France and
Germany' Paper presented at Migration, Economic Change and Social Challenge Conference, University
College London, 6/04/11 - 9/04/11, .
Publication date:
2011
Link to publication
©The Author
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 23. Jan. 2020
Regine PAUL, University of Bath/UK 
 
1 
***Work in progress, please do not cite without author’s permission*** 
Paper presented at the NORFACE “Migration, Economic Change and Social Challenge” conference, 6-9 
April 2011, University College London 
 
 
Yet another ‘tool for growth’? Labour migration policy and varieties of 
capitalism in France and Germany 
 
Abstract 
The salience of international labour migration in the ‘competition state’ and a return to active recruitment across the rich 
world challenges our understanding of national economic coordination processes. Departing from the Varieties of Capitalism 
(VoC) literature, this paper argues that labour reproduction cannot fully be captured in terms of national vocational education 
and training systems. Instead, we need to better understand to what extent policy forges foreign labour recruitment as yet 
another complement in a wider macro-economic competitiveness strategy. Evidence from document and interview analyses 
in France and Germany provokes ambivalent answers to this exploration. With regard to the beneficial treatment of high and 
specific skills entries, selection mechanisms for extra-EU migrant workers are clearly shaped by nationally distinct 
competitiveness strategies and narratives. They epitomise the aspirations of the ‘competition state’ bearing distinct 
characteristics of state-enhanced French and enabling German capitalism par excellence. The sectoral locus of foreign 
recruitment decisions in both countries and the specific German fixation on VET qualifications in admissions further follow 
well-studied economic coordination patterns. However, limits to non-EU labour entries for lower skills enforce a highly 
differential rights regime compared to high skilled entries. We observe a strong political demarcation of the ‘competition state’ 
logics in skilled and lower skilled segments, noticeably departing from orthodox economic coordination claims. This rests on 
a political imagination of a self-sufficient resident pool of labour, contained by domestic activation policy targets, EU free 
movement of labour, and, very distinctly in France, the management of a post-colonial resident population.  
 
1 Introduction 
“Professional immigration is […] a tool for growth. […] We find ourselves in a reasoning of international football, 
where the big teams recruit in the entire world, and it is these big teams that happen to be in the finals. So […] if you were to 
limit your immigration options for great foreign professional players, you could not become champion.” (FRA 6, GOV1) 
Talking in football metaphors, this French government official in the Migration Ministry2 intrinsically 
frames the role of migration policy as enabling economic growth and facilitating foreign labour imports. 
                                                           
1 FRA=France, GER=Germany; GOV=government official, UNI=trade union representative, BUS=business and employer 
representative, ADV=advisory expert; numbers distinguish interviewees further 
2 Officially: Ministry for Immigration, National Identity and Co-Development; created in 2007 and subsumed under the 
Ministry of the Interior with the government reshuffle in November 2010 
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An array of political economy literature explored and critiqued the state’s involvement in achieving 
market goals -such as competitiveness - through policy and regulation. Jessop (2002) famously depicts 
the changing role of the capitalist state towards providing and shaping the key conditions under which a 
valorisation of capital and the reproduction of labour are possible. In the hegemonic discourse of the 
‘competition state’ “the promotion of economic activities, whether at home or abroad, which will make 
firms and sectors located within the territory of the state competitive in international markets” becomes 
the main policy driver (Cerny 1997: 272; also see Sum 2009). The reproduction of labour ‘at home’ 
relies on shaping the conditions for competitiveness with an enforced emphasis on training, skills and 
skilling, and the activation of workers. ‘Abroad’ the competition state tries to facilitate economic growth 
and productivity through its ‘managed migration’ regime, and recent studies confirm that the logic of 
competitiveness through labour reproduction is indeed central to the highly selective migration systems 
in Europe and elsewhere (Menz 2009). Yet, the meaning and direction of labour reproduction differs 
across national contexts, and it is through the lens of the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature that we 
can understand this diversity: VoC’s emphasis on the vocational education and training (VET) system in 
providing the specific skills required in a particular mode of production mainly explores how labour 
reproduction is institutionalised ‘at home’. Yet, I argue, VoC so far largely lacks to address the role 
foreign recruitment plays as an add-on strategy to the VET system in the economic coordination of skills 
provision (for exceptions see: Cerna 2009, Menz 2005, 2009). 
In the ‘migration age’ (Castles and Miller 2009) mobility has become a key factor for worldwide 
economic growth and production, facilitated by the movement of capital, goods, services and also labour 
force to “where they can be most productively deployed” (Jordan and Düvell 2003: 28). Arguably, 
globalisation and the internationalisation of trade and markets have intensified these dynamics (cf. 
Ghosh 2000). After Western countries had suspended large scale ‘guest worker’ recruitment schemes 
after the 1973 oil crisis, a turn towards opening selective labour migration routes has been witnessed 
across the rich world since the late 1990s. Eventually, employment shares of foreign workers have 
become more substantial for a recent generation of newcomers in OECD labour markets, and reliance 
on migrant labour seems to have grown over the last decades. More precisely, the share of foreigners in 
employment has increased for the most recent immigrant population (those who arrived within the last 
10 years), from a 12 per cent share for all migrant workers in 2007 to over 16 per cent for the most 
recent arrivals on OECD average in the same year (OECD 2009: table II.2).3 These data support the 
argument that competitiveness and economic productivity in any given country of the rich world seem to 
rely on foreign labour imports to a relevant, on average growing, and sometimes even significantly 
                                                           
3 For countries like the UK or Spain the figure for recent arrivals is almost twice as high as the one for all foreign workers with 
an over 20 per cent and 33 per cent share in 2007, respectively. 
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growing extent. Hence, an analysis foreign labour recruitment patterns can be expected to have 
important implications for our understanding of economic governance in different institutional settings. 
The focus here is specifically on the role of the state in the shaping conditions for economic coordination 
through its migration policy and the legal definitions of entry and selection mechanisms for different 
groups of migrants. So what path and meaning does policy create for labour migration and how is it 
linked, institutionally and discursively, to wider economic coordination patterns, if at all? To what extent 
can we perceive foreign labour recruitment as yet another complementing ‘tool for growth’ fit to provide 
the specific needs of a specific production regime, as the French official neatly suggested?  
This paper examines these questions by comparing the current labour migration regime for third country 
nationals4 in two countries often discussed as significantly differing capitalist systems, France and 
Germany. This of course represents a slightly imperfect most different systems design, in which some 
outset characteristics are akin5. Germany exhibits the paragon coordinated market economy while 
France features a ‘state-enabled’ more dirigiste version with some characteristics of a liberal market 
economy (Kitschelt, Lange et al. 1999b; Schmidt 2002).  
Using an interpretive policy analysis research design (Yanow 2000, 2007) two main sources of data are 
used to expose a) main divisions legislation creates to regulate labour migration from third countries and 
b) the rationales of policy-making, meanings and drivers behind these divisions. The first evolves from a 
document analysis (laws and decrees) and detects the main selection mechanisms and admission 
criteria for migrant workers and how they link to economic coordination paths (a detailed overview of 
routes and permits is offered for both cases in the annexe). Data from semi-structured interviews6 with 
17 policy-making elites and experts in both countries then reconstruct the meanings, drivers, rationales, 
and tensions associated with the regulatory framework of labour migration. Interpretations from 
interviews enable a reconstruction of main narratives policy-makers use to distinguish between 
recruitment channels, explain selectivity mechanisms and limitations, and their meaning within wider 
macro-economic coordination. Interviews have been conducted in Berlin and Bonn in December 2009 
and in Paris in April and May 2010. The concentration on TCN regulation does not mean to 
underestimate the role of EU internal migration; while not being at the centre of analysis here, free 
                                                           
4
 I use the rather technical term ‘third country national’ (TCN) which is applied in EU regulation to distinguish between 
nationals, EU citizens with more or less complete free movement rights who are no longer considered migrants in the 
orthodox sense, and nationals from countries outside the realm of the EU whose status is regulated in conventional migration 
legislation. This is a necessarily Euro-centric approach and does not mean to imply any normative hierarchy of nationalities; 
yet, it nicely reflects the stratification that states like Germany and France apply in their legislation.  
5 While the emphasis in French coordination is believed to be less on negotiation between social partners and more on state-
enhancement than in Germany (Schmidt 2002), both theoretically share a pattern of non-market coordination mechanisms 
(Hall and Soskice 2001b) and a sectoral steering of the economy (Kitschelt, Lange et al. 1999a). 
6 As the wider research project carried out for this PhD also entails the UK as a case study, some of the interview and 
document data are used as a reference to illuminate further some findings in Germany and France where appropriate. 
Interviews in London have been carried out since November 2010. 
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movement in the EU serves as an analytical context that directly shapes the conditions under which 
TCN – as opposed to EU citizens – can enter European labour markets. 
In what follows, I will first locate cases in the theoretical framework of the varieties of capitalism and as a 
point of reference to assess migration policy as part of wider economic coordination (section 2). I will 
then analyse French and German labour migration policy in detail to explore how selection, residence 
and labour access regimes for migrant workers correspond with the presumed patterns of economic 
coordination (section 3). The discussion of findings will stipulate a reflection on interactions between 
foreign labour recruitment, economic coordination strategies, and the state’s attempt to combine growth 
and competitiveness aspirations with other -often conflicting- political objectives (section 4).  
 
2 Varieties of capitalism and labour migration 
One of the most important claims of the VoC literature is that institutions matter, that their design and 
interaction are not coincidental but follow particular strategic patterns, and that these patterns cannot be 
changed easily. Institutional complementarities are at the core of VoC’s analytical thinking, and the 
scrutiny of their role in economic governance has shown that there is more than one way of achieving 
competitiveness through firms’ coordination across institutions, thus rejecting a one-size-fits-all neo-
liberal approach and painting a heterodox vision of political economies. This section demarcates VoC’s 
theoretical framework briefly, and locates French and German economic coordination in the debate. 
 
2.1 Varieties of capitalism, institutional complementarities, state-led narratives 
The idea of institutional coherence and complimentarity in economic governance – already stressed by 
the French regulation school (Hollingsworth 1997; Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997) – serves as an 
analytical starting point in Hall and Soskice’s (2001a) account of capitalist variation. To be productive 
and competitive companies have to negotiate and coordinate their activities across different institutional 
spheres, and they are inclined do so, Hall and Soskice famously argue, in a mutually reinforcing way. 
Different product market strategies will lead to a different set-up of institutions to support 
competitiveness. Such institutional compliments operate in industrial relations, VET systems, corporate 
governance, inter-firm relations and relations with the firm’s own employees, and they do so in a logical 
and functional manner as to support the product-market strategy of companies. The main comparative 
claim of VoC then is that this functionalistic interdependence of coordination mechanisms can take 
different, yet equally successful, shapes and directions. Hence follows the famous typology of liberal 
market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs): 
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“Broadly speaking, liberal market economies are distinguishable from coordinated market economies by the extent 
to which firms rely on market mechanisms to coordinate their endeavours as opposed to forms of strategic interaction 
supported by non-market institutions.”(Hall and Soskice 2001a: 33).  
 
Both feature their very own ‘comparative advantages’ in competition and wealth accumulation 
strategies. Institutional design closely relates to competition and innovation strategies that firms have 
developed and operate in different settings. LMEs firms rely on radical innovation and shorter term 
profitability to be competitive. They pay more attention to current earnings and tribute to shareholder 
values in their financial corporate governance, and their ability to raise capital on financial markets 
depends on their short term profitability. Flexibility in staff turn-over is essential to adapt to changing 
profitability patterns, and we find a concentration on the provision of general skills through the VET 
system to cater for highly volatile skill needs. Competition characterises inter-company relations (Hall 
and Soskice 2001a: 27-31). CMEs, by contrast, follow a strategy of incremental innovation supported by 
a financial system and corporate governance structures that issue companies with capital regardless of 
profitability fluctuation. Companies mostly draw on a highly-skilled and specialised workforce, and firm-
specific skills are provided for in a specialised and diversified VET system. Skilled workforce is retained 
during minor recessions and corporate commitment to high-skilled jobs is secured in industrial relations 
through wage-bargaining, long-term employment tenures, protective work councils etc. Firm-internal 
structures reinforce network monitoring systems of long-term reputation; market shares and intra-
company relations feature trust-based processes (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 22-27).  
Much more than reducing their focus to the sphere of firm-level relationships, VoC assumptions about 
the complimentary character of social and economic institutions have come to challenge and rewrite the 
history of Western welfare states early on. In CMEs like Germany, rather than being an issue of power 
resources between labour and capital as orthodox welfare regime theory would have it, social protection 
is understood as an employer-supported incentive used to form and attract the required workforce with 
industry- and firm-specific skills. For companies’ high-value added and diversified product market 
strategy in CMEs it is essential to overcome the problem of employees’ tendency to invest in 
transferable generic skills to lower personal risks of unemployment (Estevez-Abe, Iversen et al. 2001; 
Iversen and Stephens 2008). Higher social protection levels are hence a way of recruiting the specific 
workforce needed and to sustain competitiveness. By the same token, lower protection levels both of 
employment and against unemployment in LMEs such as the US or the UK coincide with companies’ 
predominant reliance on generic skills. While we can certainly contest the validity of the axiom of 
rational employee decision-making that is put at the base of their skill formation preferences in this VoC 
literature, the notion of an almost all-encompassing complimentarity of socio-economic institutions within 
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a production regime remains highly intriguing and has, as we will later discuss important repercussions 
in labour migration strategies as well.  
One of the main criticisms of VoC – as of any historical institutionalist approach – has been its inability 
to define a ‘point zero’ in path creation or to accommodate possibilities of institutional change (Hancké, 
Rhodes et al. 2007). Yet, even attempts to go beyond institutional determinism and to account for ‘path 
creation’ and the role of agency in the design and changing of institutional settings stick to a basic 
notion of coherence and complimentarity (Crouch 2005)7. By the same token, VoC also underestimates 
the state’s role in shaping discourses about the desired directions of the national economy. We can 
draw on Schmidt’s work (2002) to understand how institutions and state-induced discourses interact 
across regime types and have contributed to significant changes, but also continuities in coordination 
models over the last 30 years. To explore how labour migration policy is fitted into a wider macro-
economic coordination process, therefore, means to account for both coordination mechanisms in 
migration regulation and the discourses resolving around institutions and processes in a state-led 
attempt to actively shape them. The analysis of policy-makers interpretations of labour recruitment 
mechanisms is at the heart of this study and aims to take the discursive dimension of economic 
coordination serious.  
 
2.2 Coordinated, negotiated, state-led, sectoral? Locating France and Germany in VoC 
While Germany is seen as the stereotype CME that features all of the characteristics abovementioned, 
France is considered slightly different in several ways, and has indeed be ‘unclassified’ by the original 
VoC approach in 2001 (Hall and Soskice 2001a) (see graph 1 for overview). Both countries traditionally 
rely on non-market forms of coordination, and the main locus of coordination is sectoral rather than 
national in both cases (Kitschelt, Lange et al. 1999b). Definitions of skill needs, whether to be catered 
for from the resident pool of labour and as products of the VET system or by importing migrant workers, 
are a matter of sectoral rather than central economic steering. Yet, several scholars have highlighted 
the more important role for state regulation of the economy in France as a form of more state-led or 
‘state-enhanced’ capitalism compared to ‘negotiated’ or ‘managed’ capitalism in Germany (Coates 2000; 
Schmidt 2002). Negotiation is championed by social partners without much state intervention in 
Germany (wage bargaining, for instance), ‘managed’ capitalism is about self-management of companies 
and sectors as well as trade unions and work councils. The state then frames its own role as ‘enabling 
facilitator’ of coordination processes in firms and sectors, rather than as pro-active agent (ibid).  
                                                           
7 Criticism also castigates VoC’s methodological nationalism and bi-polar vision of political economy, but seems at the same 
time willing to appreciate the notion of a spatially variable and nationally distinct filtering of common globalisation pressures 
(Pontusson 2005; Peck and Theodore 2007). 
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Graph 1: Classifications of France and Germany in varieties of capitalism 
Approach (authors) France Germany 
Post-war classifications   
Dirigisme and state capitalism 
State-owned business, centralised 
capital distribution, indicative planning, 
research subsidies, socialization of 
elites in administration and business 
Managed capitalism  
Neo-corporatism with important role for 
companies and social partners to self-
coordinate across VET system, social 
protection, funding systems etc. 
Varieties of capitalism  
(Hall and Soskice 2001) 
Unclassified 
 
CME case partly applicable (sectors of 
incremental innovations, but often 
much more state-enhanced) 
CME 
Incremental innovation; inter-company 
trust-relationships high and firm-specific 
skills; specialised and diversified VET 
system; corporate commitment to high-
skilled jobs secured in industrial relations  
Level of coordination in VoC  
(Kitschelt et al. 1999) 
Sectoral CMEs 
Coordination shaped by sectoral level; status and group-based welfare provision as 
expression of consensual political systems is complement to sectoral coordination 
of economy; links to conservative welfare regime types (Esping-Andersen 1990) 
 State narrative in VoC  
(Schmidt 2002) 
State-led capitalism 
State as ‘interventionist leader’ sup-
porting national champion companies; 
cross-shareholding practices; shaping 
conditions for ‘French’ competitiveness 
Managed capitalism  
Reinforces CME claims largely; state as 
an ‘enabling facilitator’ with emphasis on 
self-coordination in sectors and firms 
without state intervention (e.g. wage-
bargaining between social partners) 
Systemic incoherence      
(Culpepper 2006) 
Shift towards market-based models of 
coordination; yet government and 
companies’ rhetoric endorses ‘role of 
France in the world’; discursive 
repercussions of elite socialization 
X 
Capitalism ‘of voice’ (Loriaux 2003) 
role of national elites; emphasis on 
France’s role in the world; particular 
role for big national companies and 
cross-shareholding; big companies 
benefit most from state VET system 
X 
 
By contrast, Schmidt (2002) has described the role of the French state as an ‘interventionist leader’ that 
actively shapes conditions for firms’ competitiveness institutionally and discursively. In a dirigiste 
tradition France used tools like direct ownership - in 1981 the French state owned 13 of its largest 20 
firms -, indicative planning and strategic research subsidies to strengthen competitive sectors while 
abandoning the less competitive, and a system of credit allocation that favoured the creation of ‘national 
champions’, the developmentalist French state took a much more active role in shaping the economy 
than its German homologue (Hancké 2001; Loriaux 2003; Culpepper 2006). Culpepper (2006) insists 
that privatisations and other shifts to more market-based forms of economic governance since the 
1980s were accompanied by a discourse with a particularly French flavour. Privatisations, for instance, 
have been directed by the government to favour the creation of big national champions. Cross-
shareholding was actively promoted as a strategy to maintain the national character of French 
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companies and prevent foreign takeovers. Moreover, Loriaux (2003: 107) emphasises the role of French 
elites with careers across the private-public divide and a common socialisation “into a system of values 
that thinks in terms of national interest, of France's place in the world and in the world economy”. So 
while German coordination is joint through partnerships and tri-partite or corporative institutions, French 
economic governance is allegedly tied together through a discourse of national economic interest 
transmitted by starkly overlapping administrative and business elites.  
For both cases, changes and reforms to economic governance in recent years have triggered 
discussion about the validity of regime claims. But while evidence suggests that both France and 
Germany have introduced greater scopes for market-based coordination mechanisms, for instance in 
their capital provision regimes or in the protection of employment, we also find that distinct roles for the 
VET system, skills in the economy, or employee-relationships have persisted, and it is not appropriate to 
claim convergence to a one-size-fits-all LME model (Hancké 2001; Schmidt 2002). I therefore consider it 
helpful to use Schmidt’s concepts of managed capitalism (Germany) and state-enhanced capitalism 
(France) as variations of CMEs as an analytical starting point.  
 
3 Another tool for growth? French and German labour migration policy 
I have so far described ideal-typical economic coordination processes in France and Germany. Let us 
now turn to empirical data to explore to what extent and how both the operation of labour migration 
regimes and the policy objectives and narratives behind them speak to economic coordination in 
managed capitalism in Germany and state-enhanced capitalism in France. How are selection tools and 
mechanisms interpreted in France and Germany, which aspirations for macro-economic coordination do 
they address, and where do they depart from them? 
Let us briefly consider the main policy tools labour migration policy draws on in both countries, before 
analysing their application and meaning in more depth – graph 3 serves as an overview for what is a 
partly messy regulative area. For a more detailed overview of residence and work permits, routes of 
entry and selection criteria applied in both countries two overviews developed from document analysis 
are attached in the annexe. In both countries we can mainly distinguish between highly-skilled entries 
and shortage routes for skilled and lower skilled workers. In France, highly-skilled migrants can access 
without passing a resident labour market test (RLMT), an otherwise obligatory procedure to check the 
availability of domestic, resident or EU workers before admitting a TCN for a specific job. This applies to 
three new multi-annual (18 months to three years, often renewable) permits for so-called high potentials 
(‘skills and talents’, ‘young professionals’ and ‘intra-company transfers’) created in 2006, and to the 
permit for scientists created in 1997.  
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Graph 3: Main routes, permits and policy tools in French and German labour migration 
 
France Germany 
High-skilled 
route 
Permits: 
scientific, skills and talents, young professionals, and 
intra-corporate transfer (18 months to 3 years); 
renewable (not for TCN from poorest countries) 
 
Access/tools: 
eligible project or contract, often high prospective 
wages required; bilateral ‘migration management 
agreements’ set quotas for certain post-colonial 
migrations; access to entire labour market for ‘skills 
and talents’ and ‘young professionals’; special 
treatment of domestic graduates (admitted for job 
search); can be used as exceptional regularisation of 
informal workers 
Permits: 
settlement permit 
 
Access/tools: 
via resident labour market test (RLMT) only 
(apart from domestic graduates); postgraduate 
qualifications and/or high prospective earnings 
required 
 
Skilled shortage 
route 
Permit:  
residence permit mainly as ‘paid employee’ for 1 year, 
renewable, into designated job only, work contract 
needed 
 
Access/tools: 
via resident labour market test (RLMT) for all TCN, 
Bulgarians and Romanians; 
via shortage occupation lists for TCN in some jobs, 
more jobs for Bulgarians and Romanians; 
bilateral ‘migration management agreements’ list 
specific shortage admission options per country; 
can also be used as exceptional regularisation 
Permits: 
residence permits for duration of work 
contract, into designated job only, work 
contract needed 
 
Access/tools: 
RLMT but into defined VET-skilled shortage 
occupations only (list) 
Lower skilled 
shortage route 
same permit as above 
 
Access/tools: 
via RLMT for all TCN 
via  special shortage occupation list for Bulgarians 
and Romanians 
no access into lower skilled jobs for TCN otherwise 
same permit as above 
 
Access/tools: 
RLMT but exclusively via bilateral agree-
ments with EU pre-accession countries into 
defined untrained shortage occupations (list); 
additional labour market clause forbids any 
TCN recruitment in employment agency 
districts with high unemployment rates 
 
In Germany, highly-skilled TCN need to pass the RLMT but can immediately obtain a beneficial 
settlement permit (‘Niederlassungserlaubnis’). Additionally to the high-skilled routes, both countries 
issue temporary permits for skilled and lower skilled workers who enter into shortage occupations – for 
one year with the ‘paid employee’ permit in France and for the duration of the work contract in Germany 
with the residence permit (‘Aufenthaltserlaubnis’). Access is limited into professions with recruitment 
difficulties on the resident labour market, and demand established through the mentioned labour market 
priority examination, carried out by Employment Agencies, and/or manifested on occupational shortage 
lists. Germany further distinguishes two different shortage lists, one for VET-skilled and one for 
untrained workers, while France deals with different skill levels within the same shortage route 
regulation via the RLMT. For the shortage lists, however, France has issued two registers with different 
skill focuses for different regions of origin (Bulgaria/Romania for all shortages vs. non-EU only for skilled 
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shortages). Both countries also make use of bilateral agreements to select per country of origin in 
addition to shortage routes and high-skilled permits: Germany uses them exclusively to limit lower 
skilled and untrained shortage entries to prospective EU accession countries, while France more widely 
adopts so-called ‘migration management agreements’ which regulate and try to limit entries across skill 
levels from certain ex-colonial territories.  
From the brief policy mapping above we can establish two main legislative areas of policy tools for each 
case, across which treatment of migrants differs substantially. French and German legislation largely 
distinguish between tools for attracting highly-skilled migrants and tools to measure and fill skilled 
shortages. This suggests a regulative concentration on high skill entries, which seem to be treated most 
beneficial in both countries, and about the role of shortage migration as add-on to VET-produced 
domestic skills institutionalised through the RLMT and shortage lists. The interview analysis will now 
allow for a specification of the use and meaning of both routes. What we moreover observe in regulation 
though is the use of several tools to limit flows beyond economic definitions, especially for lower skilled 
entries. Shortages are contained to include particular nationalities, occupations, and take account of 
wider labour market conditions in both countries. Policy-makers’ interpretation of tools like the French 
migration management agreements, German bilateral agreements for shortage occupations, the 
application of RLMT and labour market clauses will reconstruct the meaning of labour migration, the 
specific treatment per skill level, and the limits on recruitment in the wider economic coordination 
process. What then do policy mechanisms and the narratives associated with them tell us about the 
soundness of VoC paths and patterns to understand labour migration (cf. graph 1)? The analysis in 
each case largely follows the above established division of legislative foci, while paying tribute to some 
of the cases’ specific attributes: the treatment of high skills, shortage skills, and tools to limit flows 
beyond the economic reasoning. A brief policy context is offered before the data analysis. 
 
3.1 French ‘immigration choisie’ – confirming patterns of a state-enhanced economy? 
In France the word ‘immigration choisie’, articulated by the Minister of the Interior Nicolas Sarkozy in 
2006, has become symbol and rhetorical incarnation of a selective labour migration approach. In the 
heated political context of urban ethnic minority riots in autumn 2005, opposition to ‘throw-away’ 
migration (‘immigration jetable’) (GISTI 2006) by part of the political left and the realm of NGOs, and 
more abstract debates about the condition of French republicanism, migration became a highly 
politicised pet subject of Sarkozy’s presidency campaign in 2007. Against all odds, Sarkozy aimed to 
“profoundly transform immigration policy in France” (Marthaler 2008: 389) with a new migration law in 
force since 2006. The regulative aim was to tailor flows much more to the country’s economic needs 
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rather than having flows ‘imposed’ (‘immigration subie’) on France by family reunion and asylum seeking 
with the aim of boosting the share of professional – and thus chosen – migration in overall flows to 50 
per cent by 2012 (Le Président de la République and Le Premier Ministre 2009). In French law, policy 
discourse and objectives of policy tools we find a clear distinction between high-skilled international 
competitiveness schemes (first column graph 3, left hand side annexe 1), and shortage admissions in 
specifically skilled and partly also lower skilled jobs (last two columns graph 3, right hand side annexe 
1). Lastly, limitations to economic reasoning apply mostly to lower skilled entries in a narrative much 
linked to post-colonial effects. Let us now scrutinise the three regulative areas in more detail. 
 
State-enhancing capitalism: high skills in the French competitiveness narrative 
Since 1998 France has introduced easier entry routes for high-skilled individuals for whom the RLMT is 
waived: first for information technologists and scientists, and in 2006 with the Sarkozy Law II that 
created three new multi-annual permit routes for ‘skills and talents’ (three years), ‘young professionals’ 
(up to 18 months), and ‘intra-corporate exchanged’ (up to three years) (see graph 4). What lies behind 
these tools? The rationale explaining liberalisation measures has been expressed in terms of 
international competition by administrators: “We equally have to acknowledge that today, with an 
internationalising economy; we punish ourselves when we build too big obstacles against workers’ 
mobility” (FRA 1, GOV).  
The partly opaque definition of entry conditions under these permits as well as overlaps between 
permits (e.g. ‘skills and talents’, ‘scientific’ or the EU blue card) are emphasised as a strength which 
allows France to offer a large ‘toolbox’ for companies to recruit the talents and professionals they need 
(FRA 5, GOV). A strong notion of state-promoted national economic interest arises in the debate about 
the rationales for high-skilled migration in France and I suggest that this sits quite comfortably in a state-
enhanced capitalist logic VoC scholars like Schmidt propose. The new permits for high-skilled migrants 
are driven by various objectives, the most commonly mentioned being attracting top elites and 
promising early career professionals (‘skills and talents’ permit), making use of domestic graduates and 
integrating them into the French labour market (job search permit for domestic graduates), and allowing 
for global knowledge exchanges on a firm level (‘intra-corporate transfers’) (FRA 1, 2, 6, all GOV, FRA 
7, BUS). This is the very context in which our introductory quotation addressed high-skilled migration as 
a ‘tool for growth’ and a tool for international championship for French companies. In this 
competitiveness narrative, eventually, labour migration is not just an add-on to the French and 
European pool of labour but a distinct strategy of labour reproduction of its own to compete for the best 
professionals on a global level. 
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For government officials, the management of this toolbox of new highly-skilled permits requires a strong 
role for the state and labour migration regulation to facilitate economic competitiveness on a global 
market especially with regard to high-skilled migration. An employers' association official supports this 
view, stating that France is competing for ‘potentials’ on a global scale with Canada, the US etc. (FRA 7, 
BUS). Yet, interview data strongly suggest an important self-perception of the French administration as 
promoter, rather than just facilitator, of highly-skilled recruitment in line with Schmidt’s (2002) account of 
‘interventionist leader’. The notion of attractiveness in France encompasses not just economically-
derived needs and demands, but is linked to the ‘splendour’ or ‘shining’ (rayonnement) of the country 
and nation as a whole, and to the promotion of its role in the world (FRA 5, GOV; see Loriaux 2003 for a 
similar argument). Enchanting labels of permits such as ‘skills and talents’ play a part in this signalling: 
one Migration Ministry official portrayed this permit as 'revolutionary' in this very context (FRA 1, GOV); 
possibly no coincidental allusion to the grandeur of French history. Another expert emphasised the 
‘emblematic function’ of permits to signal French openness (FRA 6, GOV). Even more so, another 
bureaucrat highlighted the administration’s8 role to promote new permits among employers, and to 
educate them to a more conscious and embracing use of the created recruitment routes (FRA 5, GOV).  
Given this variance between official rhetoric and employer definition of needs, we can almost witness a 
state-enhancing capitalism in French labour migration policies: the government seems to use high-
skilled labour migration as a rhetorical tool to signalise France’s openness and economic 
competitiveness to the wider world and its own residents in a way that is rather unrelated to acute 
manifest economic needs and skill definitions. This confirms Schmidt’s (2002: 204) observation 
according to which the French state lost its power of market-making in the traditional dirigiste sense, but 
continues with its market-shaping. For labour migration, this puts the cause-effect-logic between 
economic lobbying for openness and a government’s reaction with regulation upside down: it is the 
government that lobbies for new migration routes. In fact, employers do not seem to share the 
government’s enthusiasm about new permits; they regard them as tool to recruit the workers they need 
in yet another, maybe slightly easier, way. Among employers, the interest of the French State to signal 
attractiveness is indeed perceived as a more relevant driver than the actual needs of the economy: 
“The skills and talents permit, I think, reflects the interest of the French state, it is about France’s attractiveness for 
highly qualified people […] companies don’t check whether it is a permit for skills and talents, or whether it is [something 
else].  They have a demand […] and it is effectively that permit [skills and talents] that they are likely to use as it is the most 
vague, the one best adapted to the profile they need […]. I am not sure that companies identify themselves with one permit 
or another; it is a tool for them. ” (FRA 7, BUS) 
                                                           
8 especially considering the French Bureau of Immigration and Integration (OFII) as contact point with employers and advisor 
on the use of different high-skilled permits 
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Along the same lines, employers have criticised the deficient communication on new permits and entry 
routes by the administration and castigate their lack of involvement in the definition of entry criteria, 
especially for the skills and talents permit (FRA 7, BUS). So while the initial reforms of labour migration 
before the new Millennium might have been reactions to employer lobbying such as Medef’s demands 
for opening up to high skills (Menz 2009), the government’s recent policies seem to have gradually been 
detached from a close coordination with economic actors and pursue other goals, tagged onto economic 
reasoning. State-enhanced management of labour migration seems to be the name of the game. 
 
Constituting labour market borders for skills: the treatment of economic shortages 
Despite the administrative publicity for the three new permits for high-skilled workers and facilitations for 
France-based graduates, the most commonly issued permit is the temporary one for paid employees 
(salarié). Almost 16.600 of a total of 28.300 workers admitted in 2006 were paid employees. Most of the 
increase in professional entries in 2008 is in fact witnessed in the framework of the diverse temporary 
permits rather than skills, talents, young professionals etc., with admissions of paid employees more 
than doubling in this period (Sénat de la République Française 2010). The relatively low salience of 
highly-skilled entries as opposed to paid employees under the shortage routes further supports the 
argument that ‘immigration choisie’ is at least partly a state-enhanced vision about the role of high-
skilled migration in the French economy, rather than an empirical economic reality or necessity. 
The permits in the shortage occupations – either defined on shortage lists or established through a 
tension degree between offer and demand on the resident labour market in the RLMT – are not linked to 
targets of international competitiveness or attracting elites, they speak to acute or mid-term shortages 
on national, regional, or sometimes even district level of the labour market. The rationale addressed by 
interviewees in this context is thus the satisfaction of urging economy and labour market needs, rather 
than international competitiveness strategies (FRA 1, 2, 6, all GOV).The temporary permit gives access 
to the designated job only (or a special professions according to discipline of studies for graduates), but 
some categories open up to the whole labour market after two years of residence. Any professional 
activity under a temporary residence permit, requires a work contract and a constituted demand of 
foreign workforce after a RLMT (République Française 2010: L313-310). A structural labour shortage in 
a profession, sector and region has to be established by the employment agencies before a company 
can employ a TCN worker outside the high-skilled realms. Required work authorisations are distributed 
by Regional Employment Agencies (Directions Départementales de l’Emploi, du Travail et de la 
Formation Professionnelles) on the basis of a ‘tension degree’ (taux de tension) between offer and 
demand in a given sub-sector and region. Unemployment in a sector and/or region will thus prevent 
Yet another ‘tool for growth’? Labour migration policy and varieties of capitalism in France and Germany 
 
14 
migrant worker admissions under this labour market protection regime (opposabilité de la situation de 
l’emploi). This institutional setting for shortage entries speaks to VoC in several ways. It: 
1) supports the claim made earlier in the theoretical section that labour migration is a 
component of economic coordination: as an add-on strategy where the resident labour market and VET 
system are unable to cater for economic needs. 
2) indicates a sectoral (and regional) treatment of shortages in a way that Kitschelt et al. 
(1999) would have us expect for France as well as for Germany. 
3) demonstrates a strong role for regional Employment Agencies to monitor resident 
employment and reflects a relatively rigid and protective labour market typical of French economic 
coordination. Employer interviewees subscribe, at least rhetorically, fully to their role in fighting 
unemployment of some vulnerable groups of workers in France before admitting newcomers (FRA 7, 
BUS). 
4)  
Yet, the economic definition of a shortage is filtered through other sets of objectives for some nationals 
and spoils a straight forward VoC interpretation. Several interviewees discuss the boundary between 
‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ shortages, making links between migration as recruitment strategy on the one 
hand side and lower skill levels of the profession in shortage, resident unemployment figures, activation 
policy objectives and the attractiveness of certain jobs to the unemployed population on the other: 
“It’s not completely normal that we lack wood-cutters in France, if you wish, this does not demand a high 
qualification. […] We should be able to demand and offer a job to low-skilled unemployed people in France, as a kind of 
obligation. But we most often find that, unfortunately, that’s not what happens, meaning that the individuals under 
consideration are not capable or willing to do the job” (FRA 6, GOV) 
“We do not strive for low-skilled jobs. And I also think that immigration, whether regular or irregular, is attracted by 
real job perspectives in Europe” (FRA 6, GOV) 
“Because in France […] there is a co-existence of a high unemployment rate […] and at the same time non-
satisfied demands for labour of companies, as there is no evident correlation between these two populations.” (FRA 7, BUS) 
 
It can be argued that the complex tensions between the government’s aim to protect and activate the 
national workforce, French workers’ reluctance to fill low-skilled low paid jobs, and a continuous 
economic demand for labour also in lower skilled segments of the labour market creates and sustain a 
structural demand for informal workers on the French labour market (cf. Morice 1996; Terray 1999). 
While policy might not always acknowledge this interdependence, for reasons linked to electoral rhetoric 
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more than inability to perceive it, labour demands will be filled one way or another, including via informal 
recruitment patterns.  
Anderson’s and Ruhs’ recent work has powerfully exhibited the role of the state and public policy in 
shaping opportunities and constraints for migrant recruitment, for legalising or illegalising flows, and for 
conditioning and channelling companies’ use of migrant workers (Anderson 2010; Ruhs and Anderson 
2010). Interestingly, this relationship is theoretically acknowledged by a policy-maker – who argues that 
migration always follows ‘real job perspectives’ – but by the same token this is not internalised as a 
French problem with specific implications for the situation of the sans-papiers, and the rhetoric of pre-
dominantly high skill needs prevails. This is maybe the most obvious example of a clash between the 
state’s vision of economic coordination practices to balance the use of resident labour, own VET system 
and add-on strategies of foreign recruitment on the one hand side, and the socio-economic reality on 
the other. It also exposes VoC’s incapacity to account for segmented labour markets and the role of the 
lower skilled segments of a national economy – such as catering and hospitality, cleaning, construction 
etc. – as an auxiliary supporting the prestigious high value-adding ‘national champion’ industries which 
labour migration policies and economic coordination might focus on. 
 
Managing post-colonial repercussions: regulative limits for low-skilled entries 
We already established above that the selection of migrant workers in France departs from merely 
enabling companies’ recruitment needs, to articulate a state-enhanced vision of competitiveness, the 
shape of the economy, and the role of migrants in it. For the shortage narrative, we have seen how 
political objectives for the resident labour force interact with economic demand definitions, leading to 
structural shortages that are often filled by informal workers. But interviewees and critics have also 
argued that the meaning attached to permits like ‘skills and talents’ by policy-makers, rather than just 
enhancing a vision of economic coordination, reflect an attempt to rhetorically restructure the 
composition of migratory flows towards France (Ferré 2007; GISTI 2007; Cornuau and Dunezat 2008: ; 
also see FRA 3, UNI, 4, ADV). Policies aim to channel flows into the newly created and enchantingly 
labelled high-skilled entry routes while cutting back on unwanted flows. This pattern has been observed 
across Western labour migration regimes (Baganha, Doomernik et al. 2006; van Houtum and Pijpers 
2007), but it carries a particularly post-colonial flavour in a country like France. In practice, I hence 
argue, both the competitiveness and the shortage narrative interact strongly with selectivity by country 
of origin and, more precisely, post-colonial effects. We need to depart from VoC understanding to 
account for this interaction.  
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With the tool of migration management agreements9 France negotiates specific quotas for skills and 
talents, post-graduate job seekers or young professionals from some of its former colonies and it asks 
these countries to limit and control informal flows from their territories in return. Ceilings have never 
been met so far and do thus represent a symbol rather than a limitation for highly-skilled entries from 
former colonies (FRA 4, ADV). But the links between control of irregular flows of the so-called sans-
papiers – often into lower skilled segments of the formal and informal labour market – and entry 
conditions and volumes for the higher skilled turns labour migration into a post-colonial population 
management activity, rather than a mere response to economic needs. Management agreements signal 
to TCN from Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Senegal etc.: you are welcome if you are highly-skilled. The 
government’s commitment to boost the share of professional ‘selected’ migration in overall flows to 50 
per cent by 2012 hence can also be understood as a state-led re-composition of the resident population 
(FRA 3, UNI). This political dimension of labour migration links to academic accounts of an ethnicised 
dismantling of a formerly encompassing republican rights regime over the last three decades or so 
(Hollifield 2004; Hargreaves 2007). Bilateral migration management agreements aim to manage 
perceived effects of decolonisation alongside reforms of the integration and citizenship regime. So 
societal concerns add to the general economically-driven permit system for high-skilled entries and 
embody a range of selection tools that cannot be fully accounted for with the tools VoC offers. 
We find most pronounced political limits to economic entry definitions in the treatment of Algerians. 
These nationals enjoy more rights in theory as they – once admitted – have to be admitted with generic 
universal labour access rights according to current bilateral regulation. In practice, however, the liberal 
Algerian-French rights regime means that access as worker is harder to obtain for Algerians as the state 
tries to limit otherwise uncontrollable flows from the outset where possible. They are thus exempted 
from all new migration entry routes (FRA 3, UNI; 2, GOV; 4, ADV). For the other former colonies, the 
migration management agreements represent an amalgamation of control targets regarding resident 
sans-papiers, their home country’s colonial links to France, and the opening of limited entry channels to 
high-skilled individuals from the same countries. 'Chosen immigration', in this context entails an attempt 
to exchange and substitute the resident sans-papiers population – often trapped in lower skilled and low 
pay jobs – with a well selected higher skilled population (FRA 1, GOV). 
                                                           
9 France has signed 9 accords so far with Senegal (2006), Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville and Benin (2007), Tunisia, Mauritius 
and Cape-Verde (2008) and Burkina-Faso and Cameroon (2009) and another seven accords are planned until 2011, among 
others with Mali, Haiti, Philippines, Nigeria and Egypt (Carrère and Duval 2009). The Migration Ministry (MIIIDS 2010: slide 
34) stated in April 2010 that an agreement has also been reached with Brazil; while three new accords are initiated with Mali, 
Egypt and India. As responsibilities shifted to the Home Office, information varies even within administration, negotiations are 
constantly ongoing and specific agreements signed with each country, it is hard to keep track of all details of this policy tool.  
Regine PAUL, University of Bath/UK 
 
17 
A last area to challenge VoC’s explanatory scope of economic coordination in labour migration policy 
concerns the differential shortage lists France applies since 2008. Work authorisation procedures and 
RLMT have been waived for ‘professions and geographical zones with recruitment difficulties’ and were 
pinned down on shortage lists. They are applied highly differentially though: there is a list for EU 
nationals from Bulgaria and Romania – valid until free movement is completed – which comprises 150 
professions, including not only high qualified but also unskilled jobs10 and giving access to the whole 
French metropolitan territory. The second list then applies to all other potential third-country migrants; it 
is much shorter with only 35 mainly skilled and high-skilled professions11, and it is bound to regional 
shortage definitions. The general gist of the lists seems to be an opening ‘à deux vitesses’ for EU 
nationals and for TCN workers, with only the former being able to enter lower skilled professions.  
This has been interpreted as misrecognition of a labour migration reality and practice of low-skilled TCN 
employment, often in irregular situations (Carrère 2008). This criticism becomes even more relevant 
when we consider that TCN shortage list also serves as a tool of ex-post ‘exceptional admission’ of 
sans-papiers employed in shortage jobs, with the aim to legalise some already resident workers before 
admitting any newcomer (GISTI 2009). The administrative focus on high skills and skills among non-EU 
workers has eventually been criticised as an ‘administrative joke’ by observers from the NGO 
community, who, when rumours about potential case-by-case regularisation got louder, had hoped for a 
larger list that reflects the often low-skilled employment conditions of many TCN workers in France: “As 
if in the high circles of power they did not know what everybody knows, that numerous sans-papiers in 
France are employed on the most ingrate construction sites, as dishwashers in restaurant kitchens, or to 
clean car parks in the night” (Carrère 2008). In the absence of a satisfactory French/EU pool of labour 
for lower skill needs, this border definition continuously forces lower skilled TCN workers into informal 
employment situations and creates a double precariousness – of residence and employment status – 
with serious implications for levels of workers’ exploitation (Morice 1996; Terray 1999; Anderson 2010). 
 
Summarising links between French labour migration policy and VoC 
The French use of migration for labour reproduction seems to be state-enhanced for the highly-skilled 
segments linked to the government’s vision of competitiveness as well as the role of migrants in the 
economy and society. New ‘emblematic’ permits are tailored and indeed narrated to support the 
                                                           
10 It lists unskilled or low-skilled jobs such as window cleaners, housekeepers, carers for children, caterers and service staff 
in restaurants, woodcutters, metal workers in industry, coppersmiths, machine tool operators, concrete contractors etc. 
11 The TCN list comprises mostly qualified jobs such as land surveyors (geodesists), IT specialists, several types of 
engineers, site managers or other skilled construction jobs. By contrast, especially jobs in unskilled construction work, 
catering, cleaning and housekeeping – which are believed to be the main employments of irregular workers – are missing. 
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country’s and market place’s ‘splendour’, confirming VoC assumptions of state-enhanced capitalism. 
These permits are heavily promoted in government rhetoric while remaining largely unrelated to 
employers’ demands. For the shortage routes, sectoral approaches to shortage measurement both 
through the RLMT and lists confirm sectoral coordination paths as proclaimed by some VoC scholars 
(see graph 1). Yet, the mix of market logics and political admission decisions especially in lower skilled 
shortage routes indicates limits of VoC explanatory capacities for labour reproduction through migration. 
On the one hand, in RLMTs and shortage lists, labour migration presents itself as a mere technical 
decision following offer and demand and act as add-on to resident labour reproduction. But on the other 
hand, the establishment of a much reduced shortage list with mainly high-skilled professions for TCN 
workers seems politically motivated: this explicitly limits complimentary mechanisms in labour 
reproduction and contradicts labour market realities of low-skilled informal migrant work. While the 
economic play of offer and demand is embraced for most skilled shortages, lower skilled gaps have to 
be filled from the national and EU labour market excluding informal TCN residents. Migration 
management agreements with former colonies add to a picture of a highly political post-colonial 
population management tagged onto economic need definitions.  
 
 
3.2 ‘Steering migration’ in Germany – logical extension of managed capitalism? 
In Germany the need for a migration admission scheme was articulated alongside the introduction of the 
so-called Green Card for easier admission IT specialists in 2000 by then Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. 
The chancellor’s initiative made the debate of whether Germany was a country of immigration or not 
obsolete. Regardless of the persisting myth of not being a country of immigration, the consensus shifted 
towards a recognition that Germany “had to attract highly-skilled immigrants to remain economically 
competitive” (Green 2007: 112). Demographic considerations like the declining potential support ratio 
between dependent and contributing people, but also increasing labour shortages especially in skilled 
sectors, and a global competition for qualified personnel came to increasingly determine the public 
debate around migration (Unabhängige Kommission 'Zuwanderung' 2001). It is worth noting that 
demographic decline is experienced more severely in Germany than in France and serves as a much 
more pressing structural feature eventually also in political debates. Menz (2009) has observed a clear 
demand-driven economic approach towards labour migration since the later 1990s in Germany, steered 
by employers who first demanded the introduction and later the extension of the Green Card regulation 
to other sectors short of qualified staff. So after some political tensions and electoral power games in the 
second legislation chamber the Zuwanderungsgesetz eventually came into force on 1st January 2005. 
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This first comprehensive German Migration Act aims at “regulating and limiting migration” with an 
explicit focus on the regulation of labour market access for workers (Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2004). 
Besides revised definitions of asylum, some liberalising changes to citizenship and naturalisation 
practices and the enforcement of integration measures, residence permit statutes have been simplified 
and partly made more attractive for migrant workers. Most important has been the creation of a 
permanent settlement permit for highly-skilled workers and a temporary permit as well as lists for 
shortage skills. The debate remains topical in Germany with the Ministers of Economics and Trade, 
Labour, and Education calling for an urgent and more far-reaching facilitation of access for specifically 
skilled workers, especially engineers (Der Spiegel 2010).  
 
Clear stratification of rights per skill level: complementing the high-skilled economy 
Germany displays a clear stratification of entry and residence rights attached to a skill ladder drawn by 
the law (see graph 3 and overview in annexe 2), and much more pronounced than in France. Skills are 
the main categorisation mechanism in legal texts which deal with highly-skilled, skilled and unskilled 
workers in different paragraphs. High-skilled migrants12 are treated most favourably and can access 
more extensive sets of rights than others: they can be granted immediate settlement, also for job search 
(Niederlassungserlaubnis) while skilled or unskilled newcomers only receive temporary residence 
permits for employment under very specific conditions (Aufenthaltserlaubnis). The former permit allows 
high-skilled foreigners to settle without limitations and with free access to the entire German labour 
market for themselves and their family members while the temporary permit ties migrant workers to a 
sector and specific job contract (this route will be addressed in more detail in the next section). 
Employers in interviews frame this beneficial treatment as essential for the German macro-economic 
position in a world-wide knowledge exchange, for remaining a successful location of innovation in global 
competition, and for providing social goods (GER 7-8, BUS). As in France, there seems to be a strong 
sense among policy-makers in Germany that high-skilled migration serves the national interest (GER 9, 
GOV), or more specifically national economic interests. Success in a global competition for the brightest 
minds13 is facilitated, interviewees believe, through uncomplicated labour market access for TCN 
                                                           
12 The German law uses two proxies for high skills leading to access via the settlement permit: postgraduate level 
qualifications (or equivalent professional experiences) and prospective high salaries currently set at the double average 
wage of German workers, i.e. an annual salary of €63,600 in 2008 (Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2008). The assumption is 
that these highly qualified and well remunerated individuals – e.g. researchers, engineers, managers – will easily integrate in 
the labour market and contribute to growth and productivity (GER 2, 3, GOV). 
13 While interviewees agree on the objective of attractiveness for high-skilled migrants, some criticise that the reality does not 
live up to standards yet (GER 7-8, BUS; but also GER 4, ADV). De-incentivising aspects raised concern language and 
culture (non Anglo-Saxon), the lacking immigration tradition, deficient integration prospects, obstacles to the recognition of 
qualifications, lower remuneration, complexity of application and entry procedures, and lastly the weather (employers but 
also government officials raise these). 
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including their partners, the newly created settlement options, the relatively generous labour law, job 
security, and the welfare and social protection system (GER 3, 5-6, 9, 10 GOV; 4, ADV; 7-8, BUS). 
Despite government officials’ emphasis on the merits of the new settlement permit and its role in 
attracting elites, discourse around high-skilled entries in Germany has been much more technocratic 
and less emblematic than in France. This is reflected not just in interviewees’ more distanced and 
unemotional framing of the permit but also its very technical labelling (simply coined ‘settlement permit’) 
– quite far-off the French ‘skills and talents’ permit and its link to promoting the country’s splendour. We 
find a much more pragmatic and technocrat pattern of ‘enabling facilitator’ (Schmidt 2002), which is 
clearly expressed by one Home Office official:   
“[…] the role of residence regulation has to be facilitating to some extent. So, residence legislation is no end in 
itself but a means to achieve certain objectives. That concerns the mentioned objectives, our interest to recruit high and 
highest skills. So, we have to design our residence law in a way that does not discourage the Canadian professor to come to 
Germany because he has some problems with the labour market access for his wife […]” (GER 10, GOV). 
 
Apart from this discursive VoC link, the highly differential treatment of migrant workers across skill levels 
speaks to VoC in two interesting ways. It generally seems to address the CME’s pattern of a high-skilled 
economy, and that self-perception is then enabled by means of public law for migrant recruitment. It also 
confirms the claim that high and specific skills typically required in a CME are courted by means of high 
levels of security and protection, and we see in the German case how this is translated for migrants 
from the usual job and unemployment protection into residence and labour market access security by 
means of the Niederlassungserlaubnis (Estevez-Abe, Iversen et al. 2001). One official refers to the 
social protection system as a particular strength in the competition for talents, more clearly speaking to 
the logical link between specific skills-based economy and social protection Estevez-Abe et al. diagnose 
in CMEs: “Our social protection system and our labour law is indeed a trump card that we can make the 
most of. It equally protects foreign employees […] and is interesting for the highly qualified.” (GER 3, 
GOV). 
Fascinatingly, this typical CME role for social protection plays to attract domestic specialised workers for 
the high value and highly diversified product market strategy is mimicked in the residence and labour 
market access rights regime for high-skilled migrants. The treatment of high-skilled migration in 
Germany can therefore be understood as a logical extension of VoC mechanisms of social protection to 
institutionally complement and support the CME mode of production and competitiveness also for 
foreign recruitments. Policy-makers adhere to the idea that in order to attract the specifically and high-
skilled employees from abroad that, regulation needs to offer benefits and welcome workers “with a red 
carpet” (GER 3, GOV). And it is through the tool of residence rights that German administrators think 
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they can best provide this red carpet (GER 10, GOV, also GER 2, 9, GOV).  
 
Specific skills in a CME: institutionalising sectoral and VET-related needs definitions 
In the shortage routes for skilled and unskilled TCN, in contrast to the beneficial treatment of high skills, 
applicants need a concrete job offer and the temporary permit is directly linked to the duration of the 
employment contract (see graph 4 and annexe 2). It is valid for at least 6 months and can be renewed, 
unless the employment is interrupted or when the Federal Employment Agency – mainly in charge of 
the unemployment insurance and activation policies – raises labour market concerns. Any change of job 
has to be officially consented and workers usually have to remain within their initial sector of 
employment unless the Employment Agency permits otherwise. The temporary permit is moreover 
restricted to occupational sectors the Ministry of Labour has defined on a shortage list 
(Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit 2004). Migrants must display a specific skills profile in 
particular professions and sectors to be admitted via the occupational shortage routes (see central route 
in annexe 2). The definition of ‘skilled’ (Fachkräfte) in regulation involves a VET certificate equivalent to 
3 years of vocational training in the German system in the respective shortage occupation. Unskilled 
workers14 are those whose qualifications do not match a VET certificate by German standards, and their 
admission is linked to bilateral agreements exclusively as a later section will qualify in more detail. 
This close link between selection criteria, skill definitions and the standards of the German VET system 
almost functions as an extension of a particularly German CME mode of reproducing labour to external 
territories. Interviewees, indeed also employers, interpret this skills governance regime as a protection 
of the German VET system and a tool to control and guarantee the quality of imported curricula (GER 7-
8, BUS). German VET certificates remain the bar any skilled worker has to jump over if he/she wants to 
be admitted to the German labour market. This logic also applies to what I would coin a domestification 
of foreigners through the German VET and higher education system: easier labour market access for 
domestic graduates15 is treated as a matter of adequate use of domestically-trained and hence 
adequate ‘resources’ mainly16 (GER 2, GOV). Departing from the ‘VET-bar’ approach, a better 
recognition of qualifications of TCN residents is demanded to facilitate an improved use of domestically 
available ‘potentials’ (GER 3, GOV). This mainly addresses asylum seekers (Geduldete), who are 
currently not allowed to work until they have been resident for at least a year and are subordinate to 
                                                           
14 The list for unskilled labour shortages comprises seasonal workers, carneys, Au-pairs, house keepers, entertainers and 
vocational trainees (ibid). 
15 They can now job search after degree without having to go through resident labour market test. By means of extension 
beyond the territorial realm, this also applies to quasi-domestically trained graduates from German schools abroad. 
16 Issues linked to brain drain are considered (GER 10, GOV). 
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German and EU jobseekers. This does less concern the maintenance of German VET standards in 
recruitment decisions than the potentials for a pragmatic utilisation of resident labour so far forcedly 
inactive (GER 2, 3, 9, 10 GOV). In one way or another, German regulation practices hence incorporate 
the domestically trained and residents into an imagined skilled resident pool of labour available to fill 
gaps before companies can draw on newcomers. The legal obsession with the VET system in migration 
regulation is remarkable and much more explicit than in French skills definitions.  
Specific needs are also expressed on lower skills levels but they are strictly linked to VET standards. 
While all interviewees deny demand of un-trained workers, some claim that low, but specific VET-
trained skills in the care or hospitality sector are needed – currently and in the future – due to 
demographic changes (GER 4, ADV; 7-8, BUS). The framework of reference for skills, once more, is the 
German VET system, stipulating the idea of training as a certification of skills available and supported 
also on lower qualification levels. This is true for carers who enter via the low-skilled route and need a 
proof of sufficient VET qualifications and/or professional experience in the sector. The German fixation 
on the VET system as legal reference point eventually further stratifies rights in the lower skilled 
migration routes by type of qualification: the distinction then is between the un-skilled who have no 
certified skills equivalent of German VET standards, and the low-skilled but specifically trained and VET 
certified who work in lower end segments of the labour markets. And while the (allegedly) untrained 
have no place in any of the discourses – apart from seasonal workers – those with a specific certified 
training might be considered useful.  
Departing from technicalities and turning towards meaning of tools, German officials emphasise ‘flexible 
and demand-oriented recruitment’ as major ‘strength of the system’ (GER 3, GOV). Officials in both 
Home Office and Labour Ministry argue that their role is to react to changes in the labour demand of 
companies, the labour market structure and the economic situation (GER 5-6, GOV), and imply that a 
demand-led system is best able to provide this, rejecting the concept of a supply-led points-based 
system. As demand is perceived to be uneven, generic supply regulation is not considered appropriate: 
“We don’t have skilled demand across the board, but […] my feeling is that […] we will be able to reduce 
it to certain key industries and sectors.” (GER 2, GOV; also: GER 5-6, GOV; GER 7-8, BUS) 
The sectors mentioned are engineering in general and IT engineering in particular, but also care and 
medical professions. The limited occupational shortage list for skilled professions clearly expresses 
sectoral needs, currently including language teachers, IT specialists (incorporates the old Green Card), 
blue collar workers and specialists, social workers, care workers and intra-corporate transfers (BMAW 
2004). We find that this sectoral approach is mirrored in coordination patterns of needs assessment as 
well, and as in France follows coordination processes along logics of sectoral CME (Kitschelt et al. 
1999). The German approach goes beyond the French one in terms of institutional crystallisation: to 
Regine PAUL, University of Bath/UK 
 
23 
institutionalise regular sector-focused need analyses and feed them into migration legislation, the 
government has initiated an ‘alliance on skilled workers’ (Fachkräfteallianz) in 2009. This brings together 
some government resorts - such as Labour, Economy, Education, Home Affairs - the Länder, trade 
unions, employers’ associations, Chambers of Crafts and of Commerce, some companies and board 
members, and researchers to measure demand17 and offer a demographic and economic evidence 
base for both own education efforts and migrant workers recruitment as an add-on: 
“[…] this is to say, which kind of demand will we have in which economic sectors due to the demographic 
development and structural changes in the economy in the future? For instance: will we continue to need as many 
engineers? Or how many care workers do we need?“ (GER 3, GOV) 
 
While it is too early to judge on the outcome and impact of the alliance, the focus of demand definitions 
facilitated by the German government is on sector-specific18 and profession-specific assessments and 
solutions. The current political debate about facilitations for some specialists and a concentration on 
‘key industries’ point further into the direction of sector- and occupation-based need definitions.  
 
Shielding low-skilled self-sufficiency: the role of the resident and EU pool of labour 
The largely facilitating, VET-related and sectoral economic coordination of labour migration in Germany 
features strong political limits for lower skilled shortages. The economic space of a labour market gap is 
demarcated and curbed further in a narrative that highlights self-sufficiency of the resident labour market 
through the own VET system and drawing on an extended EU pool of labour. Legislation displays clear 
links to the resident labour market, and several mechanisms – in some ways similar to the French 
procedures – shall guarantee that migrant labour is an add-on, not a replacement of resident workers. 
As indicated before, all temporary permit applicants need to produce a concrete job offer and pass the 
RLMT (graph 3, annexe 2). So economic demand measurement will not directly be translated into 
migrant recruitment, but be curtailed to strike a balance with the resident and EU labour market situation 
and education prospects of current and future resident workers. This is where protectionism of the 
national labour force, both current and prospective, kicks in to demarcate the social, rather than purely 
economic space of a labour market gap as a legitimate place for a migrant worker to fill:  
                                                           
17 Interviewees discuss companies’ reluctance to disclose demands in a competitive surrounding, swiftly changing economic 
conditions, and inability to calculate concrete numerical demand as main obstacles to reliable measurement. 
18 Trade Unionists criticise this sectoral approach as fragmented and castigate the differential rights regime applied to the 
fragmented categories of migrant workers (GER 1, UNI). Alongside other policy advisors they further argue that a 
qualification-based generic recruitment through a points-based system would better equip migrants to find other jobs shall 
their sector suffer from economic downturn and job losses (also: GER 4, ADV). 
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“We always need a dual strategy: back then we linked regulation [Green Card] to a further education and training 
programme for domestic IT specialists. For we always face this issue in Germany during high unemployment: “Why are you 
recruiting people from abroad when people are at the streets here?“ This conflict needs to be tackled.“ (GER 9, GOV) 
 “[...] there are significant potentials for domestic employment, especially in the health professions, which should be 
made use of, through targeted education and training measures in precisely these areas.“ (GER 7-8, BUS)  
“This is comparing apples and oranges. [...] To give you an example: It is always claimed that we have enough 
engineers ourselves. But not quite the ones we actually need! Hence, I need a dual strategy: a further qualification of the 
skilled [residents] and migration.” (GER 4, ADV) 
 
All interviewees cited above convey a dilemma between current economic demands and the political 
aim of reproducing the required labour force mainly through efforts within the own VET system and 
activation of the unemployed. They address specific skill needs in the context of mismatches on the 
labour market, which result in a coexistence of unemployment and labour market gaps. The ‘dual 
strategy’ referred to by two interviewees favours the recruitment of migrants into current economic gaps 
but at the same time demands and investment in specific training to increase job opportunities of the 
resident labour force and close the gaps self-sufficiently in the future (cf. for UK examples of the same 
reasoning Ruhs and Anderson 2010). This supports a notion of institutional complimentarity between 
migration and VET as reproduction strategies again, but also highlights the state’s attempt to actively 
incentivise companies to use resident and VET-produced skills more. We have observed this logical link 
of VET (as the desired main source of labour) and migration policy (as add-on where VET fails to 
provide skills needed) in France, but policy-makers considered it to be much more essential in the 
German case. Skilled and low-skilled migration, in this respect, is believed to hamper own education 
efforts (GER 3, GOV, 7-8, BUS). This interdependence assumption confirms and expands the systemic 
coherence argument made by VoC scholars: labour demand staying equal, any shifts or limitations in 
one regime will increase the necessity to use the other to fill actual economic gaps19. The almost 
orthodox German CME response seems to be: investment in domestic and resident training linked to 
projections of economic needs to be less dependent and exposed to the need to recruit from abroad. 
Hence, the labour market gap is no simple statistical entity referring to current economic demand and 
supply for a specific job position. By contrast, shortages are demarcated in light of political aspirations 
about the current and future labour market participation of residents.  
                                                           
19 This point is discussed in an intriguing fashion by Bach (2010) for the UK case of nurse and doctors migration. He 
demonstrates how an active VET policy initiated by New Labour in the 2000s has reduced the UK’s traditional reliance on the 
import of medical staff. By the same token, he argues, the decision not to fund VET over decades in health professions has 
lead to a reliance on migrant workers in the first place. 
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This leads us to the wide-spread denial of low-skilled economic demand in Germany by policy-makers 
and employers alike, with the exception of seasonal agricultural work: “[...] we just have no use for un-
steered or lower skilled migration in Germany.“ (GER 10, GOV). The main rationale behind the wide 
contestation of low-skilled demand stems from national labour market and activation policy 
considerations. Lower skilled access is legislated most strictly of all channels dictating the usual RLMT, 
but also a bilateral agreement, and a labour market clause that forbids foreign recruitment, irrespective 
of economic needs, if unemployment in a particular district of the Federal Employment Agency 
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit) is considerably high. Officials see this as a double targeting of the 
unemployed as a workforce to be activated and a politically susceptible group to be protected: 
“By no urgent means do we need lower skilled workers. [...] We have enough resident job seekers who we would 
like to activate and lead to employment in that context.“ (GER 3, GOV)  
[talks about demand for seasonal agricultural workers] “I do not see that for other sectors. Well, [...] unemployment 
of the lower skilled is still so high as to make it [recruitment of foreign workers] politically difficult to image. (GER 5-6, GOV) 
 
Activation policy targets, as in France, are discursively linked here to the imagination of a domestic pool 
of labour that should be self-sufficiently filling lower skilled shortages. Yet, this debate is not linked to 
discussions about informal workers or residents, apart from the above mentioned aim of utilising asylum 
seekers’ skills more adequately in the future. Informal migrant labour is completely absent from the 
German policy-making debate. One explanation is that different from France, interviewees in Germany 
do not perceive any influential external migration pressure on the borders or within their territory; the 
lack of colonial links and geographical distance to the peripheries of Europe allegedly cut off links to 
what one government official coins ‘poverty migration’ (GER 10, GOV) and creates a ‘relatively 
unencumbered’ situation for policy-makers (GER 5-6, GOV). Without discussing the empirical truth20 of 
this claim, one thing seems evident: The alleged non-demand for low unskilled labour beyond seasonal 
work manifests in the social spaces created in laws: there is no legislated space for economic migration 
from poorer non-EU countries into other than high qualified jobs. This is a blueprint very similar to the 
French, even though it lacks the post-colonial dye.  
As in France, the perceived self-sufficient pool of labour and reproduction is legally extended to the EU 
in German regulation. The widely uncontested belief among policy-makers is that free movement of 
workers in the enlarged EU caters for the total of lower skilled needs, and thus renders obsolete any 
TCN migration into lower skilled jobs in Germany now and in the future (including seasonal agricultural 
                                                           
20 Estimates for the late 1990s suggest that there are around 500,000 informal residents in Germany with 70 per cent of them 
potentially employed in informal often low pay and low skill jobs (Boswell and Straubhaar 2004). 
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work and care demands). Free movement in the EU figures important in all interviews as potentially one 
of the most important contexts in which lower skilled migration management is framed today: 
„Well, we have to see whether there will be lower skilled demands at some point, but that will now partly be equalised 
by the prospective free movement of workers from Bulgaria and Romania in 2011 and 2014. So, in that respect, I think we 
will not have extraordinarily huge demands in the near future.“ (GER 7-8, BUS; also GER 3, 5-6, 9, 10 GOV) 
 
This imagined EU pool of labour is extended to accession candidates in the recruitment of low-skilled 
staff via bilateral agreements. The quotas for care workers exclusively recruited from Croatia, for 
example, is interpreted as a pre-accession simulation of free movement in which wage and qualification 
differentials are steered and in a way that does not over-challenge21 the German labour market (GER 5-
6, GOV). As in France this legally manifested relationship between lower skilled demand, supply 
through free movement of CEE workers and a cutting back on TCN flows is heavily criticised by trade 
unionists. They expose a dismantling of migrant workers’ rights by denial of settlement and integration 
perspectives to a flexible, free-moving, and often circulating EU workforce that is not even considered 
as migrants (clear case for this made by GER 3, 5-6, GOV). Debating the situation and employment of 
posted workers alongside other forms of circular migration, unions fear potential implications of the 
creation of a ‘third category of workers’ for wider labour conditions (GER 1, UNI). 
 
Summarising links between German labour migration policy and VoC 
The differentiation of rights between high-skilled, skilled and low-skilled migrants is more pronounced in 
Germany than in France in legislation with the former being offered permanent settlement from the 
outset. However, the favouring of high-skilled entries relies less on population management through 
certain kinds of economic enhancement like in France, but instead on a more technical facilitating 
approach. This confirms VoC assumptions about the role of the German state in economic coordination. 
Facilitation mainly draws on a novel rights regime that intriguingly mimics the role of social protection in 
a CME for high-skilled migrants. German officials further divide the treatment of labour migration 
channels through a VET-prism with admissions into skilled shortages being dependent on VET-
equivalent qualification profiles. In this we can observe the state’s attempt to render coherent economic 
governance across labour reproduction systems in a manner supportive of the aspirations for a high and 
specifically skilled labour equilibrium. Yet the sector- and occupation-based need definitions, though 
institutionalised in the ‘alliance for skilled workers’, foremost treat migration as an add-on to the 
                                                           
21
 Equally, the German decision to phase in free movement in gradual steps after 2004 for CEE nationals is seen as a 
successful way of managing wage differentials and preventing potentially over-burdening flows from the A8 countries, while 
the UK is seen as a negative example by most observers in that respect (GER 3, 5-6, 10, GOV; not employers though). 
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prioritised domestic labour reproduction through the VET system. Moreover, the ‘measured’ labour 
market gap is no simple statistical entity referring to current economic demand and supply for a specific 
job position. Shortages in Germany are demarcated in light of political aspirations about the current and 
future labour market participation of residents. Activation policy targets are linked to the imagination of a 
domestic pool of labour that should be self-sufficiently filling lower skilled shortages. This political 
agenda implies the belief that free movement of workers in the enlarged EU can cater for the total of 
lower skilled needs, and thus renders obsolete any TCN migration into lower skilled jobs in Germany 
now and in the future. Regardless of the empirical validity of a perceived absence of migration pressure 
there is no entry option for migration from poorer non-EU countries into other than high-skilled and 
skilled jobs in Germany. Labour reproduction is heavily curtailed by political aspirations and role 
definitions for different categories of workers that VoC cannot explain. 
 
4 Varieties of capitalism and labour migration – an ambivalent relationship 
In the ‘age of migration’ (Castles and Miller 2009) the exploration of  ways in which we can, and indeed 
cannot perceive foreign labour recruitment as yet another complementing ‘tool for growth’ in a VoC 
framework aspires to be a crucial task. Data from France and Germany suggests that the relationship 
between labour migration policy and VoC paths of economic coordination is ambivalent. Labour 
migration policy seems to generate institutional complimentarity with regard to the beneficial treatment 
of high and specific skills, epitomising characteristics of state-enhanced French and enabling German 
capitalism in several ways. Indeed in the competitiveness narratives in both countries, labour migration 
serves not just an add-on to resident labour pool but as a distinct strategy of labour reproduction of its 
own right to compete for the best professionals on a global level. In France, this logical link is 
accompanied by a nation-centred state-enhanced, sometimes even state-enhancing, promotion of new 
permits and migration routes associated with the overarching aim to secure the splendour of the nation 
and economy worldwide. In Germany, we observe a more technocratic management of the high-skilled 
realm: the state’s enabling role is much more constrained to serving the economy and facilitating 
growth, rather than changing the role and behaviour of companies with the promotion of specific 
permits. Key to the German regime is the concentration on a favourable rights regime with permanent 
settlement and free labour market access for the highest skilled migrants. The rights regime almost 
mimics the role social protection in a CME usually plays to attract domestic specialised workers in a 
high value and highly diversified product market strategy. The treatment of high-skilled migration in 
Germany can therefore be understood as a logical extension of VoC mechanisms to institutionally 
complement and support the CME mode of production and competitiveness. Sectoral coordination 
patterns are confirmed in both countries in the realm of shortage definitions, the management of 
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shortage recruitment and in Germany through an institutionalisation of sectoral skills demand 
measurement in the ‘alliance for skills’. Moreover, the specific German fixation on VET-equivalent 
qualifications in admissions further coheres with VoC economic coordination patterns. Education and 
training and migration policy complement each other in the state’s facilitation of economic growth and 
productivity and specify the meaning of ‘gap’ and shortage into which migrant workers can be recruited. 
VoC overall seems fit to capture how highly-skilled migration is treated and how high and specific skills 
are defined in the regulatory framework of both countries.  
This treatment of the high-skilled realm reflects the importance of the ‘knowledge-based economy’ as a 
widely shared orthodoxy in economic policy-making (OECD 1996; Commission of the European 
Communities 2003). With its policy plan on legal migration and the green paper on an EU approach to 
managing economic migration the European Commission has linked economic growth and labour 
migration policy-making, and highlights their relationship specifically in a context of demographic decline 
and labour shortages in Europe (Commission of the European Communities 2004, 2005). A common 
response seems to be what interviewees dubbed a ‘dual strategy’ of domestic education efforts plus 
selective legal migration as an add-on strategy to facilitate labour reproduction in shortage situations in 
both countries. Indeed the role for labour migration as yet another ‘tool for growth’ in a globalising 
economy is echoed by employers and administrators across the rich world (OECD 2009; cf. statement 
in introduction by a French official). As a result, labour migration policy has become an important aspect 
of market-making in Europe and cannot be neglected as a factor in economic governance.  
For the high-skilled segments of the economy then France and Germany seem to follow Cerny’s 
‘competition state’ (1997) in perceiving their role as active promoter or enabling facilitator of 
competitiveness. The ‘stock of human capital’ being as important for economic growth as the 
knowledge-based economy rhetoric suggests, the option of limiting the scope of recruitment to the 
national realm does not seem acceptable or practicable neither for globally acting companies nor for the 
policies supporting their growth (Zaletel 2006). However, the ‘competition for the brightest minds’ has 
not lead to convergence or integration of labour recruitment patterns, it instead even reinforces intra-EU 
competitiveness (Mahroum 2001; Cerna 2009). Regulative foci differ substantially between the French 
promotion of emblematic permits linked to the splendour of the country and economy, and the rather 
technical German recruitment approach using a certain social protection logics to attract the skills 
deemed necessary. The role of the state, its policies, and associated policy discourses to define the 
needs of the economy by its migration policies, or to select the parts of the economy that are supported 
by facilitation of foreign recruitment, cannot be understated in that respect.  
The agreement that labour migration is a ‘tool for growth’ does not translate into harmonised policies, 
presumably also because member states feel that their distinct patterns of socio-economic regulation 
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need to be safeguarded. So while labour migration in the ‘knowledge based economy’ is foremost linked 
to competing for the ‘brightest minds’ across the globe and produces a rhetorical concentration on high-
skilled migration as booster for competitiveness, the concept of a ‘knowledge base’ is filtered through 
the nationally distinct legislative designation of ‘required’ skills. What skill requirements mean, we have 
seen in the cases presented here, can be very different in different economic settings. This is indeed 
one of the main VoC claims when referring to high and specific skill needs in CMEs and generic skill 
needs in LMEs. OECD data suggests uneven patterns of skill needs in a cross-country comparison 
(OECD 2004). Germany, for instance, has witnessed an especially high loss of lower skilled jobs which 
has statistically eaten into the growth in higher skilled jobs (details for the German case in: Allmendinger 
and Ebner 2006). Other countries, such as the UK, however, have seen greater growth in lower skilled 
jobs, or indeed an equal increase in lower and higher skilled jobs (France). So while an overall trend 
towards the ‘knowledge-based economy’ is visible in the EU and member states such as France and 
Germany, its implications and actual operation are differential across countries and economies. 
Supporting this argument, Menz’ (2009: 261) comparative study clearly indicates continuing divergence 
of foreign labour recruitment strategies shaped by national policy legacies of economic coordination 
patterns: 
 “Coordinated market economy production patterns [...] require mainly highly-skilled well-trained labor migrants that 
can easily be integrated into a high value-added production pattern [...]. Liberal market economy production patterns 
necessitate a steady supply of labor migration into both low-wage low-skill service sector positions where poor working 
conditions and wages are combined with structural flexibility requirements lead to low staff retention.”  
 
Closely linked to the competition state and knowledge-based economy perceptions, we find a clear 
political demarcation of economic shortage definitions in skilled and lower skilled segments of 
recruitment. This concerns the political definition of borders between the globally recruited knowledge-
base and some ‘other’ part of the national economy which the competition state loathes to address. In 
both France and Germany the imagination and legal enforcement of a self-sufficient resident pool of 
labour is narrated as a matter of domestic activation policy targets and unemployment protection of the 
resident labour force. Applying selectivity by nationality policies further draw on conditions shaped by 
EU free movement of labour, and very distinctly in France the management of post-colonial effects. 
Legal channels for labour migration from poorer non-EU countries into other than high qualified jobs do 
not exist. Arguably, these selection mechanisms expose VoC’s incapacity to account for segmented 
labour markets as well as the political struggles over economic needs satisfaction within them. It is 
indeed one of the main weaknesses of VoC to hugely concentrate on prime segments of the national 
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economy and the alleged pulling horses of wealth accumulation while neglecting more auxiliary but 
equally important parts of the economy.  
 
This exploration of labour migration as labour reproductive strategy in economic coordination of variable 
capitalisms calls for further research in several ways. The mirroring of typical economic coordination 
patterns in the German facilitation of high-skilled entries and the French discursive promotion a vision of 
‘splendour’ deserve more attention. Neatly as they seem to fit into paths of competitiveness strategies 
rhetorically, they also clearly stretch the borders of high-skilled labour reproduction far beyond the 
national realm, thereby challenging the orthodox nationalistic methodology in VoC. We need to better 
understand recruitment patterns and labour reproduction beyond the nation state’s territory and 
legislation in today’s economic environment. This would imply an empirically richly informed re-definition 
of the relationships and interactions between national economies and specific globally acting 
companies, global labour flows and persistent national border regimes, spatially fix domestic labour 
markets and highly mobile workers, nationally distinct VET systems and globally transferrable and 
struggled over skills. But while there is certainly a globally-oriented economic reasoning behind 
migration policy and distinct competitiveness strategies, states seem to retain the political power to 
define what qualifications are, what needs are, what shortage are, how different needs and shortages 
should be addressed, and what kind of hierarchy should determine selection for different routes. While 
high-skilled access is increasingly universalised according to competitiveness logics, and even 
implemented in common market tools like the EU Blue Card, the management of labour reproduction in 
lower-skilled shortages is strongly contained within national borders. VoC does so far not address the 
differential implications of global competitiveness targets vs. acute shortages in labour reproduction 
strategies. We hence need to study in more depth the here diagnosed complex interactions of distinct 
competition states with wider legislative conditions curtailed by EU free movement, filtered by policy 
objectives such as the activation of resident unemployed or the protection of the domestic labour pool, 
and framed within historical-systemic fixes such as migrant integration regimes linked to past patterns of 
flows. This complex picture so far depicts a dialectical answer to the question whether labour migration 
is ‘yet another tool for growth’: it portrays strong brushstrokes of a clear yes in the high- and specifically-
skilled segments of the economy, but equally conveys many shades of rather not in the socio-politically 
curtailed realms of skilled and lower-skilled labour reproduction. Those seem to shed empirical 
spotlights on an often overlooked dark side of varieties of capitalism22. 
 
                                                           
22 I owe the reflection on a neglected ‘dark side’ of capitalist varieties to fruitful discussions with Ulrich Jürgens. 
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Annexe 1: Overview of legal entry mechanisms for TCN migrant workers in France (July 2010) 
conditions for all: concrete job offer or ‘eligible’ project outline required for all, self-maintenance without social benefit 
rights acquisition: free labour market access after two years of contributions through  employment for most; access to long-term residence after five years 
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Annexe 2: Overview of legal entry mechanisms for TCN migrant workers in Germany (July 2010) 
conditions for all: concrete job offer required for skilled and low-skilled, self-maintenance without social benefits 
rights acquisition: free labour market access after three years of pension contributions in employment, or after four years of legal residence; access to long-term residence after five years 
 
 
 
